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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RONNIE C. BYRD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950399-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for two 
counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, 3rd 
degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(Supp. 1996) (a copy of the judgment is attached hereto as 
Addendum A), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the prosecutor's use during trial of 
Defendant/Appellant Ronnie C. Byrd's ("Byrd") post-arrest silence 
violated his right to remain silent and prejudiced his right to a 
fair trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW; Because the issue concerns the 
violation of a constitutional right, it is a question of law with 
respect to which this Court will not defer in any degree to the 
trial court but will review the trial court's determinations for 
1 
correctness. State v. P^n^r 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Byrd's motion 
for a new trial where the state breached its duty to supplement 
discovery responses relevant to Byrd's defense. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A ruling denying a motion for a new 
trial will be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. 
State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
At trial Byrd objected to the state's examination of an 
officer and the state's cross-examination of Byrd concerning 
Byrd's post-arrest silence during police interrogations. The 
examinations violated Byrd's Fifth Amendment and due process 
rights. Record on Appeal (,fR.M) at 169-87; 484; 528-30; 600-01; 
659-60. 
In addition, Byrd requested a new trial based on the state's 
introduction of surprise testimony that directly conflicted with 
earlier information provided by the state during pretrial 
discovery. (R. 169-87.) The surprise testimony compromised 
Byrd's credibility to the jury. (R. 169-87; 460-469.) 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 -- Discovery. 
Utah Cons art. I, § 7. 
Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
2 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
On October 14, 1993, Byrd was charged by Information with 
two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
third degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). (R. 7-8.) After Byrd engaged in 
pretrial discovery (R. 13-14), the jury trial commenced. (R. 68; 
74-76; 265-671.) At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found 
Byrd guilty on both counts and Byrd requested a new trial raising 
the issues set forth herein. (R. 121-22; 169-87.) The trial 
court denied Byrd's request (R. 207-08) and entered a judgment 
sentencing Byrd to serve indeterminate, concurrent terms at the 
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years. (R. 201-02; 207-08.) 
Byrd is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison and appeals from 
the final judgment. (R. 209.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to the trial in this matter, Byrd's counsel engaged in 
pretrial discovery, which included interviewing officers who 
arrested Byrd and investigated the events leading up to his 
arrest for two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance. (R. 13-14; 132.) Officer Thomas Scott Grant 
3 
("Grant") disclosed to defense counsel and testified at trial 
that on October 12, 1993, officers were engaged in a clandestine 
operation at Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 357-66.) 
Grant observed the following events at the park through a 
telescope and video camera from the second floor of a building 
next to the park: a car pulled up to a curb along the park, a 
pedestrian approached the car, the car occupant(s) and the 
pedestrian apparently engaged in a conversation, the first 
pedestrian left, -^ nd a second pedestrian approached the car, 
twice handed items through the front passenger-side window of the 
car, and took what appeared to be cash from an occupant in the 
car. (R. 369-73.) 
When the car pulled away and left the park Grant notified 
other officers that he had observed a drug transaction between a 
pedestrian and the front passenger of the car and he described 
the car to the officers. (R. 410; 475-77.) Officers Martin 
Kaufman ("Kaufman") and David Thurgood ("Thurgood") followed the 
car for a number of blocks from Pioneer Park, briefly lost it in 
traffic, located it again, and initiated a stop of the car. (R. 
410-12; 477-480.) The officers testified that while they 
observed the car, none of the occupants made a furtive motion 
toward the floor of the car and/or toward the front passenger 
seat area. (R. 428-29; 414-15.) 
Three individuals were in the stopped car. Byrd was in the 
front passenger seat. (R. 412-13.) Thurgood approached the car, 
asked Byrd to jet out, lead him to an area away from the car and 
4 
arrested him. (R. 415; 481-83.) 
After Byrd's arrest, Thurgood searched only the front 
passenger seat area of the car and found two items tucked under 
that seat. The items were later determined to be cocaine and 
heroine. (R. 416-18; 484-86.) During a pretrial interview 
Kaufman disclosed that he did not search any other area of the 
car and neither he nor Thurgood searched or arrested the other 
car occupants. (R. 419-22; 443-44; see also 445-47.) The 
officers allowed the other car occupants to drive away without 
being questioned or searched. (R. 415-16; 442-44; 486.) 
The state and the officers did not supplement discovery 
responses or correct any misrepresentations that were provided to 
the defense during pretrial discovery concerning the events 
leading up to Byrd's arrest. (R. 420-22.) Thus, counsel for 
Byrd proceeded with a defense that (1) either the driver or the 
back-seat passenger, or both, were the actual parties to the 
alleged drug transaction (R. 343-50), and (2) the drugs found in 
the car belonged to the owner/driver or other occupant, and were 
placed in the car before the events at the park occurred. (R. 
349-50; 461-62.) Byrd's counsel introduced the defense theory 
to the jury during opening statements, calling the attention of 
the jurors to evidence that would show there was no search of the 
car other than the right front passenger seat, that all three 
passengers would have had access to the only area of the car that 
was searched, and that the other two occupants were not question-
ed, searched, or investigated but were released shortly after the 
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officers stopped the car. (R. 348-50; see also 438-43.) 
The defense was surprised at trial when Kaufman testified 
that he conducted an exhaustive search of the car after Thurgood 
completed his minimal search of the passenger area of the car. 
(R. 131-33; 416-17.) Such testimony served to compromise the 
defense's credibility to the jury and to invalidate the defense's 
theory and trial strategy. (R. 465-66.) 
In addition, during the trial Thurgood testified on direct 
examination that immediately after Byrd was arrested, Thurgood 
advised Byrd of his rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), and asked Byrd if he wanted to make a statement. (R. 
483; 486-87.) According to Thurgood, Byrd said "yes," but 
"declined" to comment in response to police interrogations. (R. 
483-88; 529-32.) Counsel for Byrd immediately objected on Fifth 
Amendment and constitutional due process grounds to the 
prosecution's line of questions concerning Byrd's refusal to 
respond to officers' questions and made a motion for a mistrial. 
(R. 528-29.) However, clear implications were already before the 
jury -- Byrd's silence and his failure to deny involvement in the 
alleged drug transaction implicated him in the charged offenses. 
During Byrd's cross-examination, the prosecutor again raised 
the issue of Byrd's silence in the wake of the Miranda warnings. 
(R. 600-01.) The prosecutor asked Byrd the following: 
(By the prosecutor) Q: Do you remember the officer 
testifying that when he gave you the Miranda warnings 
you said, "Yes I'll talk to you"? 
(By Byrd) A: I remember him saying that. 
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Q: Do you remember him giving you the Miranda 
warnings? 
A: I can't remember if he did or not. 
Q: So it could have been or it could not have been; 
that's what you are saying? 
A: I just know[,] I didn't talk to him. 
Q: You certainly did not say anything to him about the 
driver buying these drugs, did you? 
A: I didn't say anything about no drugs, period. 
Q: And certainly you didn't want to protect these 
guys, did you? 
(R. 600-01; 659-660.) Byrd's counsel made a request for a new 
trial based on prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Byrd's 
constitutional rights. (R. 171-87.) The jury found Byrd guilty 
on both counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(R. 662-63), and thereafter, the trial court denied Byrd's 
request. (R. 207-08.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During trial, the state made repeated references to Byrd's 
post-arrest silence in the face of officer interrogations. The 
state made its first reference through the state's witness on 
direct examination, and the second reference through Byrd on 
cross-examination. References at trial to a defendant's post-
arrest silence are violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the federal constitution and article I, sections 7 
and 12 of the Utah constitution. 
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The state's duty to supplement information provided to the 
defense during pretrial discovery is ongoing and consistent with 
a defendant's right to a fair trial. In this matter, during 
pretrial discovery the state arranged for Byrd's counsel to 
interview Kaufman concerning the events surrounding Byrd's 
arrest. In preparing Byrd's defense, counsel relied on Kaufman's 
pretrial representations that the officers did not conduct a 
complete search of the car. At trial Kaufman's testimony 
contrasted with the information he provided to Byrd's counsel 
during pre-trial discovery. The state's failure to advise Byrd's 
counsel of the change in the officer's testimony compromised the 
defense's credibility to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE'S INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN ITS 
CASE-IN-CHIEF OF BYRD'S POST-ARREST SILENCE AND THE USE 
OF POST-ARREST SILENCE BY THE STATE DURING CROSS-
EXAMINATION TO IMPEACH BYRD VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS AND 
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution provides: 
"No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." The Miranda warnings are a 
prophylactic means of safeguarding the Fifth Amendment rights, 
and require "that a person taken into custody be advised 
immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to 
retained or appointed counsel before submitting to 
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interrogation." Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution likewise provides 
that an accused "shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself.nl 
In Dovle, 426 U.S. at 610, the Unites States Supreme Court 
ruled that prosecutorial comment for impeachment purposes on a 
defendant's silence is violative of the Fifth Amendment and the 
due process provision of the federal constitution,2 and is 
grounds for the reversal of a conviction. In that case, the 
prosecutor attempt-ed to undercut the defendants7 exculpatory 
explanation for a drug sale by asking them during cross-
examination why they had not reported their version of the events 
to the officer at the time of their arrests. The Court held that 
use of the defendants' post-arrest silence after receiving 
Miranda warnings was impermissible. "Silence in the wake of 
[Miranda! warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's 
exercise of [those] rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is 
insolubly ambiguous because of what the state is required to 
advise the person arrested." Id. at 617. 
1
 In determining whether Byrd's rights under Article I, section 12 
were violated, Byrd is not urging that the analysis under the Utah 
Constitution is different from an analysis under the federal 
constitution. See State v. Mace, 295 Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah 1996). 
2
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution provides, 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. . . ." Art. I, sec. 7 of the Utah Constitution 
guarantees fundamental fairness at trial, and for purposes of this appeal 
the analysis of that provision is not different from the analysis under 
the federal counterpart. 
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Although Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that 
silence will carry no penalty, such an assurance is implicit to 
persons receiving the warnings. " [I]t would be fundamentally 
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested 
person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial." Id. at 618. 
In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the prosecutor drew 
attention to the defendant's post-arrest silence. Id. at 147. 
Such conduct constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 
In State v. Reves, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this 
Court identified four factors that must be considered in 
determining whether post-arrest silence has prejudiced a 
defendant. The factors are the following: 
(1) whether the jury would "naturally and necessarily 
construe" the comment as referring to defendant's 
silence: (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was 
isolated; and (4) whether the trial court instructed 
the jury not to draw any adverse presumption from 
defendant's decision not to testify. 
Id. at 1057. Consideration of the factors in this matter compels 
the determination that the prosecutor's questions concerning and 
references to Byrd's post-arrest silence prejudiced Byrd. 
During the state's case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from Thurgood that he arrested Byrd, provided him with 
his rights per Miranda, and asked him if he wanted to talk. Byrd 
replied yes. However, in the face of police interrogations, Byrd 
declined to make a statement. (R. 483-88; 529-32.) In addition, 
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during Byrd's cross-examination, the prosecutor specifically 
questioned Byrd about his refusal at the time of the arrest to 
make a statement to officers. (R. 600-01.) The prosecutor's 
comments and questions specifically and clearly referred to 
Byrd's silence, thereby demonstrating prejudice under the first 
factor set forth in Reyes. The prosecutor engaged in the line of 
questions concerning Byrd's silence in order to impeach him and 
to highlight the fact that for whatever reason, Byrd declined to 
give the officers his version of the events on October 12, 1993. 
Byrd's refusal to talk to the officers could be seen as 
inconsistent with his defense that he was not the buyer in the 
transaction, and did not stash the drugs beneath the car seat. 
With regard to the second factor in Reyes, the state's case 
was based on a video of an ambiguous exchange taking place at a 
distance through the passenger-side window of a car (R. 373; 
state's trial Exhibit 1), Grant's testimony that he observed from 
a distance an exchange of some kind (R. 369-73; 395-400), and 
Thurgood's incredible testimony that Byrd confessed to buying 
drugs. (R. 489-90.) 
According to Thurgood, he transported Byrd to the jail, a 
distance of four blocks (R. 511), and as he "pull[ed] up to the 
jail doors" he initiated a conversation with Byrd, stating, 
"What's up, what's going on?" (R. 489-90.) Byrd allegedly 
responded to the small talk with a statement that he purchased 
drugs at Pioneer Park. (Id.) Thurgood did not reply to Byrd's 
alleged statement and made no attempt to preserve it. He simply 
11 
noted the alleged confession in his police report. (R. 516-19.) 
Byrd denied making any such confession. (R. 573-76.) 
The confession evidence hinges on credibility; the remainder 
of the evidence against Byrd is inconclusive and not overwhel-
ming. If the jurors concluded Byrd was not credible, their 
conclusion likely was based on the fact that Byrd did not defend 
himself to the officer during the post-arrest interrogation. 
Evidence of Byrd's post-arrest silence prejudiced him. 
The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much 
more weight to the defendant's previous silence than is 
warranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the 
reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the 
strong negative inference that the jury is likely to 
draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent 
at the time of his arrest. 
U.S. v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975) . The jurors' conclusions 
in this case were based on their weighing of conflicting evidence 
-- Byrd's testimony versus Thurgood's testimony. Thus, the 
likelihood that the jurors were improperly influenced by the 
prosecutor's questions concerning Byrd's post-arrest silence is 
significant. Indeed, the jurors likely relied on that evidence 
to interpret and weigh Byrd's version of the events. 
Under the third factor in Reyes, the Court considers whether 
the reference to the defendant's post-arrest silence was an 
isolated incident. In this case the prosecutor referred to the 
post-arrest silence both during the state's case-in-chief and 
during the defendant's case. The reference was not isolated. 
With regard to the fourth factor in Reyes, during both the 
state's case-in-chief and Byrd's cross-examination, when the 
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prosecutor asked about Byrd's post-arrest silence, Byrd's counsel 
immediately requested a bench conference, made objections on 
constitutional grounds, and moved for a mistrial. (R. 528-29; 
659-60; 171-87.) The trial court declined to consider the motion 
until after the jury commenced deliberations. (R. 657-58.) 
Although the trial court had the opportunity to admonish the jury 
to disregard the prosecutor's comments and the evidence 
concerning the post-arrest silence, the trial court failed to do 
so. The trial court should have taken some measure to ensure 
that the jury avoided, as far as possible, the fact that Byrd 
declined to respond to the officer's post-arrest interrogations. 
The trial court failed in this endeavor, thereby influencing the 
outcome of the case. 
Use of Byrd's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes 
created an inference of guilt and violated his due process rights 
and his protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
art. I, sees. 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
When a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda 
requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he 
says may be used against him, and that he may have an 
attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not 
comport with due process to permit the prosecution 
during the trial to call attention to his silence at 
the time of arrest and to insist that because he did 
not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as 
he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference 
might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony 
. . . . Surely Hale was not informed here that his 
silence, as well as his words, could be used against 
him at trial. 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 183 (1975) (J. White, 
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concurring). it is impossible to know the full impact on the 
jury of the prosecutor's comments concerning Byrd's post-arrest 
silence. The evidence against Byrd was inconclusive and 
conflicting, as set forth above in connection with the second 
factor in Reyes. The jury likely drew an unfavorable inference 
from Byrd's post-arrest silence. It is reasonably likely that 
without the occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct, the results 
would be different. Because Byrd was prejudiced by the comment, 
his conviction must be vacated. 
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE CONTINUING 
DISCOVERY AND TO CORRECT MISINFORMATION REPORTED TO THE 
DEFENSE BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "imposes a duty 
on the prosecutor to provide discovery material to the defense on 
request. This duty is continuous and applies whether a 
prosecutor is responding to a court order or is voluntarily 
producing information." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1242-
43 (Utah), cert, denied, 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993) (prosecutor 
violated duty by failing to disclose that substance of witness' 
testimony had changed on the eve of trial from that contained in 
pretrial interviews); State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 
1994) (the state has the duty to comply with discovery requests 
fully and forthrightly). 
[W]hen the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily 
to a request under subsection (a)(5) [of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure] without requiring the defense to 
obtain a court order, considerations of fairness 
require that the prosecution respond to the request in 
a manner that will not be misleading. 
* * • 
[W]hen the prosecution agrees to produce any of the 
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material requested, it must continue to disclose such 
material on an ongoing basis to the defense. 
Therefore, if the prosecution agrees to produce certain 
specified material and it later comes into possession 
of additional material that falls within that same 
specification, it has to produce the later-acquired 
material. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). 
For discovery purposes, ,f [i] nformation known to police 
officers working on a case is charged to the prosecution since 
the officers are part of the prosecution team. Neither the 
prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold 
exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to a defendant." State 
v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984). 
Failure of the police to reveal such material evidence 
in their possession is equally harmful to a defendant 
whether the information is purposely, or negligently, 
withheld. And it makes no difference if the 
withholding is by officials other than the prosecutor. 
The police are also part of the prosecution, and the 
taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the 
State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure. 
Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th 
Cir. 1964) . 
In this matter, Byrd made a timely request for the discovery 
of all police reports and investigations. The state provided 
reports prepared by Thurgood and represented that Kaufman did not 
submit written papers in connection with the incident. Thus, the 
state arranged for defense counsel to interview Kaufman by 
telephone two days before the trial. (R. 465-68.) Kaufman 
provided defense counsel with a telephonic pretrial statement 
concerning the search of the car --he stated he did not search 
the car. (R. 419-20.) At trial, he testified in a manner that 
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was materially inconsistent with his earlier, pretrial statements 
-- he testified that he searched the entire car. (R. 416-17.) 
Kaufman admitted that he failed to advise defense counsel of the 
material change in his testimony. (R. 132.) 
Because Kaufman and the state failed to notify defense 
counsel of the material change, counsel made representations 
during opening statements based on Kaufman's pretrial 
misrepresentations. During the state's examination of Kaufman at 
trial it became clear that defense counsel presented a theory to 
the jury that did not conform to the evidence, thereby directly 
placing the credibility of the defense in issue. Had the state 
provided Byrd's counsel with a summary of Kaufman's changed 
statement, Byrd's counsel could have altered and salvaged the 
defense, by focusing solely on the state's failure to investigate 
and search the other occupants of the car, without putting the 
credibility of the defense in issue. Byrd's entire trial 
strategy was thwarted by the state's failure to disclose the 
change in Kaufman's testimony. The state's failure to update and 
supplement the discovery information prior to trial hampered 
Byrd's ability to fully and fairly prepare for trial. 
Although the trial court had at its disposal the power to 
obviate any prejudice resulting from the state's breach of the 
discovery rules, the trial court in this matter failed to take 
curative measures or to impose sanctions against the state. Utah 
R. Cr.n. P. 16 (g) ("If at any time during the course of the 
proc^eiings it is brought to the attention of the court that a 
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party has failed to comply with this [discovery] rule, the court 
may . . . enter such [order] as it deems just under the 
circumstances"). The trial court could have barred the state 
from presenting the conflicting evidence, admonished the jury to 
disregard Kaufman's testimony where it was inconsistent with the 
defense's theory of the case, or granted a new trial. Instead, 
the trial court permitted the state to present the testimony. 
The state's conduct undermined the purpose of the discovery 
rules, that is the elimination of unnecessary technicalities and 
the removal of the element of surprise or trickery so that the 
parties and the finder of fact could determine the facts and 
resolve the issues directly, fairly and as expeditiously as 
possible. See Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967). 
[A] criminal proceeding is more than an adversarial 
contest between two competing sides. It is a search 
for truth upon which a just judgment may be predicated. 
Procedural rules are designed to promote that 
objective, not frustrate it. When a request or an 
order for discovery is made pursuant to [the discovery 
rules], a prosecutor must comply. To meet basic 
standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is a 
real quest for truth and not simply a contest between 
the parties to win, a defendant's request for 
information which has been voluntarily complied with, 
or a court order of discovery must be deemed to be a 
continuing request. And even though there is no court-
ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to disclose 
newly discovered inculpatory information which falls 
with the ambit of [the discovery rules], after the 
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of evidence 
might so mislead defendant as to cause prejudicial 
error. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). The supplemental 
discovery information was improperly withheld from the defense in 
violation of Rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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A review of the record reflects that if the information had 
been provided to the defense, counsel could have prepared and 
presented the case to the jury in a manner that was consistent 
with the evidence presented at trial, without drawing attention 
to issues that later proved to be unsupported by the evidence. 
The defense was not given the opportunity to fully and fairly 
prepare its case. In addition, Byrd's counsel was forced to 
abandon the defense theory of the case as presented to the jury 
in opening statements, and to restructure the defense theory in 
the middle of trial, thereby compromising the integrity of Byrd's 
defense. The state's failure to inform the defense of Kaufman's 
change in testimony prejudiced Byrd. Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 
849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making 
reference to Byrd's post-arrest silence, and failed to advise 
defense counsel that a witness' testimony had changed since 
discovery, Byrd is entitled to a vacation of the conviction and a 
new trial void of misconduct. 
SUBMITTED this kit- day of r * ^ * . . - ^ 1996. 
LINDA M. JONES A 
JUDITH A. JENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
..J& B1S7RJCT C JURT 
Third Judicial District 






^ n ^ i A C &|fA 
Case No. ^ ^ P \ f t - ! > 1 
Count No. T 
Ifflft \ -10-5 l 
Honorable M'.CJTYUI g *V i rpWj 
Clerk VAftS 1 
Defendant. 
Reporter &cv|\e* ( V n i n g h M I 
Bailiff — f l i n t y NAn^or-VVi 
Date _ ± i l i l l £ 5 
D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is a granted a denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by $ a jury; D the court; O plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest; of the offense of \ \ n \ t x w M i \ rcs<&^*i\ aVn g^rtWnWe^ ^ W A w j
 a felony 
of the _J$L_ degree, a a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by A V / . ^ and the State being represented by U fc \\eA V JS now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• to a maximum mandatory term of 
JS not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
Q of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
a not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for life; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ to 
# such sentence is to run concurrently with fraud \ 
O such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of a State, a Defense, a Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
^1 Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County ^ffor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
TJ Commitment shall issue ^Pf-MOVAfrVVl 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page of_£_ 
(Wn»t«—Court) (Gr*tn—Judg«) (Vttow— ja»vPn%o*. AP1P) (P»nn—0«f»n*«> (GoJd*nrod—State) 
UEDBISTMCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT *PR 1 0 1995 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
 r s^T>AKe COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH, B* ^—- D«fkjtyQMC 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. <\h\<\0\9&\ 
SA > Honorable rA»cV*A ft y \u rnVw 
J Bailiff G & r V \ U ^ f T h -
Defendant. Data H - \ 0 - q S 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is O granted a denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by fi, a jury; a the court; D plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest; of the offense of VJAVIWVYA ^f^stcS'xcn dt a tnnVrMVA ^ ^ n r t , a felony 
of the _>S degree, a a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by v\ .^ fe.rV£*.n and the State being represented by \/< fcUfeVV is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
O to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
^T not to exceed five years; 
O of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
G not to exceed years; 
a and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of S to 
53 such sentence is to run concurrently with counV T 
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of a State, 0 Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
a 
G Defendant is granted a stay of the above (G prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
TO Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County £Tfor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
# Commitment shall issue FncAiNVAJiVVi 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page _J^L of J3^_ 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney «hfl11 make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has Med to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate. 
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
